http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=869044071&play=1

A znači to se tako računa.
Ja se satro od računica koja će mi pokazati gdje će market, nisam ni znao da je ovako lako.
Puno zahvaljujem, uštedjeli ste mi dane i dane računanja i kalkulacija TA, FA i xyz analiza.
Hvala, hvala , hvala.

Evo baš gledam predsjedničku debatu na CNN, nema NIKAKVE šanse da se ne dogovore oko plana, već u uvodnim izjavama su to potvrdili, pa nisu amerikanci ludi (inače meni se ne svidjaju ni oni ni njihova uloga, al to sada nije tema). Situacija je takva da sada svatko pokušava izvući više glasova u predizbornoj kampanji, Obama (iako je u pravu) jer rekao da moraju riješit problem i dao neke ideje što bi on napravio, ali je i spomenuo da treba vidjeti i zašto je do problema u prvom redu došlo i da je on upozoravao da bi se to moglo dogodit, nekako mi je to jako poznata priča… Uglavnom da ne skrecem s teme, ne obazirite se na ove zagovaratelje armagedona jer bi oni samo htjeli dobiti jeftino vaše dionice, a vi razmislite da li bi reciomo prodali novi ispravni audi A4 za 1000€ upravo to ovi "medvjedići"n od vas žele…

Moram se malo pohvaliti premda možda nisam u situaciji, ali ćemo vidjet kaj će ovi ameri odlučiti.
Pričao sam ja Vama o armagedonu, pričao sam ja Vama o največem sranju koje će se dogoditi, a vi ste me ismijavali ali i vaš brat Vjeko također.

Ako odobre lovu idemo gore na kratki rok, jednostavno će biti let u visine, ali kaj nakon toga?
Tko misli da će USA oporaviti sa tih 700 mlrd $.
Ljudi moj savjet, ako dođete na nulu ili mali plus, nemojte biti pohlepni i izađite u cash djelomično.

Samo mi dajte jedinice ako želite ali nakon velikog rasta koji će biti u pon, slijediti će pad kroz tjedan dva. Za 10 dana dolaze nova izvješća u USA koja će po svemu sudeći biti jako loša.

Ja u pon ili utorak idem večim dijelom u cash jer nije dobro i neće biti dugo dobro.
Evo to je moje mišljenje, ajde da sada čujem vaše, samo bez vrijđanja. samo kažite kaj mislite.

Naravno pričamo o amerima ne o našoj burzi i ekonomiji.

Bratić, Washington Mutual nije u sastavu DJI indeksa …

http://finance.yahoo.com/q/cp?s=%5EDJI

[/quote]

Pa makli su ga nedavno iz sastava Djia.
A inače ne mogu se oteti dojmu da većina vas pjeva na brodu Titanic.
Kad shvatite na kojem ste brodu biti će premalo pojaseva za spašavanje.

Previše smo počeli ovisiti o Amerima, a oni su milimetar do Worst case scenaria.
Ako još dolaze 3Q kod Amera,a sve im je u banani, onda se zna put.

Ne znam koliko ćemo se mi moći oduprijeti, ali ja koji sam većinom u cashu, mene je strah za pare.
Evo govore o DJIA da će na 8000, ne odmah, ali mislim da to nije naučna fantastika.

Post od forumaša sa Mojnovac.com
"Borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages, who had been planning to sell or refinance their homes at a higher price, were stuck with homes worth less than expected, along with mortgage payments they could not afford.
As a result, many mortgage-holders began to default. These widespread defaults had effects far beyond the housing market.
See, in today’s mortgage industry, home loans are often packaged together and converted into financial products called mortgage-backed securities. These securities were sold to investors around the world.Many investors assumed these securities were trustworthy and asked few questions about their actual value. Two of the leading purchasers of mortgage-backed securities were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Because these companies were chartered by Congress, many believed they were guaranteed by the federal government. This allowed them to borrow enormous sums of money, fuel the market for questionable investments, and put our financial system at risk.
The decline in the housing market set off a domino effect across our economy. When home values declined, borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, and investors holding mortgage-backed securities began to incur serious losses.
Before long, these securities became so unreliable that they were not being bought or sold. Investment banks, such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, found themselves saddled with large amounts of assets they could not sell. They ran out of money needed to meet their immediate obligations, and they faced imminent collapse.
Other banks found themselves in severe financial trouble. These banks began holding on to their money, and lending dried up, and the gears of the American financial system began grinding to a halt."
"Washington Mutual Bank, the country’s largest savings and loan, was seized late today by federal regulators and immediately sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co., the New York banking giant that has long coveted the thrift’s California and Florida branches.
With assets of $307 billion and deposits of $188 billion, Washington Mutual is the largest bank to fail in U.S. history.Washington Mutual depositors won’t lose access to any of their money, even if it wasn’t fully insured, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said."

Kad vidite butchers bill za idući tjedan, skužit ćete da dok ekipa iz washingtona izglasa ovu pomoć financijskom sektoru, u tom trenutku to neće pokrivati ni tekuće bankrote…a neki oporavak zaboravite…

Fortis
Wachovia
UBS
CitiGroup??

Swedish model inspires US financial crisis plan
Published: 22 Sep 08 17:59 CET
Online: http://www.thelocal.se/14496/20080922/

The Bush administration’s handling of the financial crisis is in part inspired by a successful Swedish bank rescue in the 1990s, but one crucial deviation could cost US taxpayers dearly, one of the architects of the Swedish plan said on Monday.

US learns lessons from Swedish banking crisis (20 Sep 08)
Swedish banks ‘well-equipped’ to weather financial crisis (18 Sep 08)
Bank experts play down Swedish crisis fears (17 Sep 08)

"In principle (the United States) is following approximately the same route we did, but the (slightly different) model chosen, I’m afraid, could cause problems," Bo Lundgren, head of the Swedish National Debt Office and who recently briefed US authorities on Sweden’s experience, told AFP.

Unlike Washington’s proposed $700 billion bailout for faltering financial institutions, which has been described as a "no strings attached" deal, Sweden in the early 1990s took control of its struggling banks in exchange for emergency aid, thus making the taxpayers footing the bill owners of the ultimately valuable assets.

Once the crisis was over, the Swedish state sold off nearly all of the nationalized bank investments, getting back most of the money that had been pumped into the sector.

The US rescue package "will certainly lead to more stability and will ensure that things will work better, but there’s a risk that the cost for tax payers will be steeper than it would have needed to be," Lundgren said.

Lundgren, who served as Sweden’s deputy finance minister in the early 1990s when the entire Swedish banking sector teetered on the edge of the abyss, said last week he had met with representatives of the US Federal Reserve in New York to brief them on how his country dealt with the crisis.

"We have seen a lot of curiosity about what we did in Sweden, since what we did at the beginning of the 1990s worked fairly well," he said, adding that he earlier this year had also told the International Monetary Fund (IMF) about the successful Swedish rescue plan.

Like the current global financial trouble, Sweden’s banking crisis was sparked by years of crazed property speculation that followed deregulation of the country’s credit market in 1985.

"The similarities consist in the fact that there is a bubble that has burst, and that bubble was linked to real estate," Lundgren said, pointing out however that while the US subprime crisis is centred around private homes, the Swedish turmoil mainly involved commercial real estate.

According to the Swedish central bank, "a tidal wave of bankruptcies" between 1990 and 1994 left Sweden’s seven largest banks, which accounted for 90 percent of the market, with loan losses totaling the equivalent of 12 percent of Sweden’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).

To alleviate the sector’s pain, the centre-right government in Stockholm at the time took a hands-on approach, pumping cash into the banks deemed to only have temporary problems and letting the ones believed to have no prospect of viability go under.

Two banks were taken completely over by the state, which in turn offered a blanket guarantee for all creditors, but not for share holders.

"When you reach a certain situation you have to go in and do something that re-establishes confidence. We introduced a guarantee for all creditors but not for stock holders. That guarantee made it possible for everyone to do business with the banks without risk," Lundgren said.

"If a bank was to receive help, we took over a corresponding amount of influence in the bank so we could ensure that we could get the money back," he added.

The Swedish state took over insecure loans during the crisis worth around 65 billion kronor ($9.9 billion) of taxpayer money, but eventually got most of it back through di

In contrast, Lundgren said, Washington’s rescue package appears to favour stock holders without much prospect of the tax payer-spent money ever being reimbursed.

"What’s happening in the United States now entails a big risk that stock holders will win. If the banks survive, the stock holders’ holdings will still be there but the tax payers will have to foot the bill," he said.

"I would rather have seen them choose a route where they — with the cash injection — offer to go in as an owner of the banks, giving them influence, and then sell when the crisis is over," he added.

US learns lessons from Swedish banking crisis
Published: 20 Sep 08 14:40 CET
Online: http://www.thelocal.se/14466/20080920/

The US debt rescue plan has sought inspiration from the work to tackle the Swedish banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s.

Bank experts play down Swedish crisis fears (17 Sep 08)
Economic downturn hasn’t stopped Swedes from borrowing (5 Aug 08)
"I have been in the USA several times this year to explain what we did," said Bo Lundgren at the Swedish National Debt Office.

"There can be significant similarities," Lundgren added.

Lundgren was finance minister in the 1991 right-wing government and, together with current and former Riksbank heads Stefan Ingves and Urban Bäckström, was the architect behind the bank support committee (Bankstödsnämnden or Bankakuten) which did much to alleviate the crisis that raged in the Swedish banking system from 1990-94.

Several years of hysterical property and commodity speculation in the 1980s plunged Sweden into its worst financial crisis since the 1930s.

"There are significant similarities between the current American financial crisis and our own financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. It concerns a finance and property bubble that has lead to large losses in the the banking sector."

Lundgren argues, like the US president George Bush, that governments have a major part to play in such exceptional situations, adding that there is a good chance of reclaiming the money.

"The sums that we had to cover amounted to 60 billion kronor ($9.83 billion). But together with the resurrection of Nordbanken meant that by 1997 the outlay had been more than halved by reclamations," said Lundgren.

"And since then the state has probably been reimbursed all of the money. The money went primarily to Nordbanken and Gota Bank, which later merged, and to the liquidation firms Securum and Retriva.

Securum and Retriva’s task was to take care of all the bad debt held by Nordbanken and Gota Bank.

The US treasury is reported by the BBC to be preparing a $800 billion fund to buy back a large proportion of US mortgage market debt. The intention is to store the debt in one organisation on behalf of the taxpayer until such time as they can be sold off.