Pa ako ćemo gledati vlasničku strukturu, većina Fondova i jest strana, jer su im vlasnici banaka stranci.

Mislim, bez fondova ne može sustav funkcionirati, ali za njihove me probleme zaboli. Isto kao i njih za moje probleme, kad ih imam.

Ma nije tako crno.
Ali želim samo da ljudi postanu svjesni da su pretpostavke po kojima će fondovi spašavati njihovo ili vaše dupe braneći nekakve pozicije u Hrvatskoj po meni pogrešne.
To bi vam otprilike bilo kao kad bi se u nogometu branili tako da svi stanu na gol.

SLK

Fondovi su za one koji nemaju vremena ili znanja za samostalni rad na burzi te za jako bogate ljude.

potpisujem…

Ja ne cekam da oni spase moje dupe. Moje dupe je puno lakse od njihovog, te puno brze od njih promjeni poziciju [smiley1].

Evo dok je ovakvih vijesti i ova tema će biti na prvoj strani foruma

Vaš link

I to je točno i izuzetno bitno.
A i tvoje se dupe ne uslika u roku od tri dana na SDA da si se krenuo izvlačit iz dionice.

Ma Galinec je svašta izjavljivao po medijima, pa kad su ga prozvali, onda se posipao pepelom i svaljivao krivicu na novinare. Pogledajte slučaj IPKK i “inside info”…tekstove…i vidjet ćete tko je u pravu…[smiley2]

Equity fondovi naravno da nece nikog spašavat, ali mirovinski ce ipak obranit dionice prve kotacije na nekim razinama ( INA nekidan).

One dionice koje su najviše porasle od početka godine su i najviše pale. Građevinske (osim Dalekovoda) i Todorićeve (osim Belja). Vidimo zadnji slučaj Žitnjaka i Mlinara. Dobro, tu su još luke i brodari. Mojih deset dionica niti jedna nema višu cijenu nego je imala u siječnju ( osim DLKV) tako da se ja nemam čega bojati. Fundamenti i dugoročno ulaganje i nema straha.

[color=blue]Monetary policy[/color]
Hazardous times
Aug 23rd 2007
From The Economist print edition
The Fed has a new problem: convincing investors it does not need to cut interest rates yet

LEND freely but at penal rates was Walter Bagehot’s advice to
central bankers in a liquidity crisis. Lend freely and reduce
interest rates has been the panicky demand of many investors
shocked by the speed with which a crisis among low-quality
mortgage borrowers in America has ricocheted around the
world. So far the central banks, led by America’s Federal
Reserve, have tried to have it both ways. The Fed has lent
freely, not always at penal rates. Meanwhile, it has talked a
cautious game: no firm promise that any interest rate will be
cut, but the odd hint that all the options are open in monetary
policy, especially when it comes to protecting the real economy
from the turbulence on the markets.
From many investors’ point of view, this has worked a treat. Stockmarkets, which seemed in a state of
panic on August 16th, have recovered some of their poise. More importantly, the credit markets,
especially the ones where banks lend to each other, look more relaxed. Yet much of this relief is based
on a single expectation: that the Fed will cut interest rates soon, perhaps even before its next ratesetting
meeting on September 18th. This looks doubly dangerous: a rate cut is not certain; it would also,
quite possibly, be the wrong thing to do. Hence, the increasingly urgent need for the Fed’s chairman, Ben
Bernanke, to let down his new admirers gently.
The willingness of investors to pin their hopes on a rate cut is understandable: after all, that has been
the response of the Fed to every financial panic since the stockmarket crash of 1987. The Fed has also
craftily encouraged that belief, while not yet committing itself. On August 17th, in addition to cutting the
discount rate which banks pay it for emergency lending, the Fed’s rate-setters acknowledged that
financial turmoil now posed a risk to America’s economy. The tone was so different from the Fed’s
statement just ten days before, when inflation was its biggest concern, that markets automatically
assumed a rate cut was imminent. But was that wise?
House of cards
Begin with the fact that both the Fed and the markets have an overwhelming long-term interest in risk
being priced correctly. The new model of financing, in which debt is repackaged and risk is dispersed
through a web of derivative contracts, has much merit. But it plainly has had an unhappy consequence:
when a problem emerged (in this case, in subprime mortgages), it was harder to work out whom it was
safe to do business with. Banks became wary of lending to each other. The outcome was frighteningly
similar to a bank run, but one that affected the entire wholesale money market.
From this perspective, it certainly made sense for central banks to stop that run by supplying short-term
money. Nobody wants a temporary cash shortage to turn into a solvency crisis, where otherwise valuable
assets are sold cheaply into a market gripped by fear. Temporary loans to the banking system should
grease the market’s wheels and enable it to grind out its own solutions.
However, a shift in the longer-term stance of monetary policy, by lowering the benchmark price of
money, is a very different proposition. A rate cut does not just increase the supply of cash; it directly
influences people’s calculations about risk. Cheaper money makes other assets look more attractive—an
undesirable consequence at a moment when risk is being repriced after many years of lax lending. It is
not surprising that some investors think the Fed is setting a floor under asset prices.

Daj Kamenac piši hrvatski ko mi ostali.[smiley2]

ili srpski, da te ceo svet razume..